rules-privacy-macos

Reading the macOS AddressBook database directly bypasses TCC privacy controls and exposes all contact information without user consent. Access contacts through the Contacts framework with user authorization.

Accessing HealthKit databases (healthdb.sqlite, healthdb_secure.sqlite) exposes extremely sensitive health data including heart rate, sleep, medication, and medical records. This data has strict legal protections under HIPAA and GDPR.

The macOS Keychain database stores passwords, certificates, and private keys encrypted at rest. Attempting to read the raw keychain file directly bypasses all authorization controls — use the Security framework APIs.

Accessing CoreLocation cache databases or routined.db exposes the user's location history, frequent locations, and travel patterns — sensitive personal data protected by TCC.

The Messages chat.db contains all iMessage and SMS conversations. Accessing it directly bypasses TCC and exposes private communications. This requires Full Disk Access permission and explicit user consent.

Accessing the Photos library database directly exposes all photos, videos, albums, and metadata without user consent. Use the Photos framework with explicit user authorization via TCC.

Reading Safari's History.db and Bookmarks.db accesses private browsing history, search queries, and saved links. This data is personal and protected by Full Disk Access restrictions.

Automated screen capture (screencapture -x without UI sound, -T 0 immediate) can silently capture screen contents including sensitive data, passwords, and private information.

The macOS security(1) CLI can extract plaintext passwords and certificates from the Keychain without a GUI prompt when the keychain is already unlocked. dump-keychain, find-generic-password -w, and find-internet-password -w return plaintext credentials. Never use these commands programmatically — prompt the user to retrieve their own credential.