rules-d

RISK: Shell-based process APIs (spawnShell, executeShell, pipeShell) pass the command through /bin/sh, enabling command injection if any user-controlled value is concatenated (~) into the command string. FIX: Use execute()/spawnProcess() with an explicit string array of arguments, avoiding shell interpretation entirely.

std.c.stdio is a deprecated C stdio binding. Use core.stdc.stdio (D runtime's C interface) or D-native std.stdio instead for type-safe I/O.

RISK: @system code disables D's memory-safety checks (bounds checking, null dereference protection) for that scope. FIX: Prefer @safe/@trusted; if @system is required for C FFI, restrict its scope to a minimal wrapper function and document the invariants.

RISK: @trusted signals to the compiler that the function is safe to call from @safe code, but does NOT enforce memory safety itself — the programmer assumes full responsibility. Misuse is a common source of memory bugs in D. FIX: Add a comment documenting exactly why the code is safe; minimize the @trusted scope to the smallest possible function body.

RISK: cast(void*) removes all type information and bypasses D's type system, leading to undefined behaviour on access or reinterpretation. FIX: Use typed pointers or std.bitmanip for controlled bit-level access; restructure to avoid void* entirely.